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2 
INTRODUCTION 
It might well be argued that no other industry was as 
important in the civilization of man as flour milling. As man 
discovered the process of grain milling he was able to evolve from 
wanderer, to farmer, to city dweller. The sale of flour is 
considered by many historians to be the first industrial 
enterprise. Wheat, grown for over 10,000 years, was regarded as a 
symbol of life and power by the ancient Assyrians, Egyptians, Jews, 
Greeks, and Romans (steen p. 19). Both the art and business of 
grain milling evolved as world population grew. The cUltivation 
and milling of wheat migrated with man from the ancient 
Syrian/palestine region to Europe, Asia, and Africa (Storck & 
Teague p. 35). Each new society contributed some innovation which 
increased productivity in the industry. 
The milling industry also played a pivotal role in the 
geographic and economic development of America. Corn was the major 
indigenous crop of the Western Hemisphere, but attempts at growing 
wheat were made soon after the first colonists arrived. Milling 
was the most important industry in the colonies. Early American 
exports of flour were 522,000 cwts (100 pound weight measure) in 
1774 and 725,000 cwts in 1789 (Steen p. 30). George Washington 
himself was an exporter of high quality flour to the West Indies. 
The post-colonial government made the milling industry one of its 
first regulatory targets. Some of these early efforts insured the 
quality of flour exports and others were more protectionist, 
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prohibiting imports. 
As the 20th century approached the milling industry began to 
change. In response to the rapid expansion of the u.s. in both 
population and geographic size a new era of technological 
innovations was born. This period is known today as the "Milling 
Revolution". It was also during this time that many of the 
companies that are today the giants of flour milling and other 
industries, the focus of this study, began to take shape. 
PURPOSE & REASONING 
This project attempts to trace and analyze the evolution of 
five United States food processing companies, Archer Daniels 
Midland, Cargill, ConAgra, General Mills, and Pillsbury from the 
time of the "Milling Revolution" of the late 1800's through today. 
This process involves the study of two related sUbjects, 
environmental change and industry evolution. Environmental 
analysis can be separated into the study of two sUb-environments, 
the external and internal. The evolution of the milling industry 
may be thought of as the combined histories of these and other 
organizations, their individual products, processes, markets, 
capital investments, and other factors as they have changed through 
time. This work initially begins with the identification of 
critical junctures in the industry's history when environmental 
changes forced these organizations to alter or adapt their 
strategic planning. However, this proj ect also attempts to explore 
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the reasons behind these decisions and assess the results of them 
on the organizations themselves and the industry as a whole. This 
is the object of the study of business policy and strategy. 
This industry makes an interesting subject for analysis for 
several reasons. Its significance in the early history of both 
civilized man and America has previously been noted. The 
importance of any agriculturally based industry also deserves 
mention. Peter Drucker stated in The Age of Discontinuity, 
"Agriculture in the developed countries has become the most 
productive, the most capital intensive, and the most highly 
mechanized, and altogether the most "industrial" of all modern 
industries." (p. 17). The milling industry has also been extremely 
important in the development of the Midwest. Obviously the 
Midwestern farmer benefited from the rise of the milling industry, 
but many cities like Minneapolis, Omaha, and st. Louis also owe a 
great deal of their early prosperity to this industry. Many other 
communities grew as a result of their roles as collection points 
and rail spurs in the transportation of grain. This industry is 
also one in which, since the 19th century, America has continually 
been the world leader in terms of productivity, technology, and 
product development. 
There are also reasons for the selection of these specific 
firms. All five firms in this study are linked together by either 
a longstanding and/or large current participation in the flour 
milling industry. They are all of sUbstantial size in terms of 
employees, sales, profits, and market size and scope. For example, 
3 
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the Cargill Corp. has been the largest privately held company in 
America for most of the last ten years. It employs 61,600 persons 
worldwide, and with revenues of 4.8 billion dollars last year 
ranked 8th in terms of all U.s. companies (Milling & Baking News 
Feb. 11, 1992 p. 14). This size subsequently leads to the 
availability of large amounts of pUblished information in a wide 
range of areas vital to this analysis. 
FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY 
There currently exist numerous frameworks for the analysis of 
business and policy issues. The uncertainty of today's business 
environment in comparison to that of the past might suggest the 
need to utilize the work of more contemporary business theorists, 
in contrast to older, more traditional texts. During the last 
decade the work of Michael Porter, professor, Harvard Business 
School, has gained a great deal of acceptance in both the business 
and academic communities. Porter's most read works have focused on 
the analysis, development, and retention of competitive advantage 
on both single firm and international levels. The performance of 
the organizations selected in this work points to the development 
of competitive advantage. Porter's work has been chosen as the 
framework for this analysis because of its timeliness, its 
acceptance, and its relation to this industry in particular. 
There is a somewhat more universal consensus among business 
theorists as to which factors comprise the first of the two sub­
environments, the external. For purposes of this work the 
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external environment will be considered to be the sum of economic, 
technological, social, and political/legal forces. Porter 
addresses the issue of the business environment in his competitive 
strategy, saying the following. 
The essence of competitive strategy is relating a company 
to its environment. Although the relevant environment is 
very broad, encompassing social as well as economic 
forces, the key aspects of the firm's environment is the 
industry or industries in which it competes. Industry 
structure has a strong influence in determining the 
competitive rules of the game as well as the strategies 
potentially available to the firm (p. 3). 
In light of this belief he has derived his model of industry 
competition, which will be considered the internal portion of the 
business environment for this work. 
Porter's model of industry competitiveness is shown in Figure 
1. He defines "industry" as a group of firms producing products or 
services that are close sUbstitutes for each other. As the diagram 
shows, Porter believes the competitive environment is compose~ of 
five independent forces which combine to form total industry 
competition. competition is of paramount importance to any 
business, since it is competition that lowers the rate of return on 
capital and effects the ultimate profitability of an industry 
(competitive strategy p. 6). The individual strength of these 
forces varies with the industry. Those which are the most powerful 
naturally become the most crucial in terms of strategy formulation 
for the firm. 
The first of the five forces, Threat of New Entrants, is 
located at the top of Porter's diagram. The entry of new firms 
into an industry obviously effects the competitive environment. 
5
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Depending on their size, strength, and the industry arrangement, 
firms may be pulled into a bidding war for inputs and customers. 
Profitability can suffer. Countering this threat are what Porter 
describes as Barriers to Entry. These are "structures" that have 
arisen either naturally or through the direct action of firms or 
others that make entry into the industry more difficult for would-
be participants. Porter describes seven maj or types of entry 
barriers, Economies of Scale, Product Differentiation, Capital 
Requirements, switching Costs, Access to Distribution Channels, 
Cost Disadvantages Independent of Scale, and Government Policy (pp. 
10-3) • 
Proceeding clockwise along Figure 1, the Bargaining Power of 
Buyers is the next force which affects industry competitiveness. 
These powers may be of a wide range, determining price, quality, 
and service and of varying degrees. Generally, the more powerful 
the buyers are as a group in an industry, the greater the 
competition. In this model a buyer group is regarded as powerful 
if: 
1) It is concentrated or purchases large volumes relative
 
to seller sales.
 
2) The products it purchases from the industry represent
 
a significant fraction of the buyer's cost or purchases.
 
3) The products it purchases from the industry are
 
standard or undifferentiated.
 
4) It faces few switching costs.
 
5) It earns low profits.
 
6) Buyers pose a credible threat of backward integration.
 
7) The industry's product is unimportant to the quality
 
of the buyer's products or services.
 
8) The buyer has full information. (pp. 24-7)
 
The next force in Porter's model is the Threat of Substitute
 
Products or Services. SUbstitutes are an important component of 
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industry competition. Porter defines sUbstitutes as a product or , 
service that performs the same function as another. The more 
substitutes available, the greater will be the competitiveness of 
the industry. He believes the most threatening sUbstitutes to 
firms are those which "(1) are SUbject to trends improving their 
price performance tradeoff with the industry's product, or (2) are 
produced by industries earning high profits" (p. 23-4). The more 
attractive a SUbstitute is perceived to be by the buyer the less 
range the industry participants have in establishing prices. If 
prices rise above the relative cost of the next best alternative a 
switch may well likely occur. In making strategic decisions firms 
need to consider the full range of substitutes for their product or 
service. 
Continuing along the diagram, Porter next addresses the 
Bargaining Power of Suppliers. Depending on their strength, 
suppliers can raise the price of the inputs they sell, or they can 
restrict the supply of inputs and thereby intensify the existing 
competition within the industry. Porter believes the conditions 
that make suppliers powerful, and thus increase industry 
competition, are similar to those of the buyers. A supplier group 
is considered to be powerful if: 
1) It is dominated by a few companies and is more
 
concentrated than the industry it sells to.
 
2) It is not obliged to contend with other substitute
 
products for sale to the industry.
 
3) The industry is not an important customer of the
 
supplier group.
 
4) The suppliers' product is an important input to the
 
buyers business.
 
5) The supplier group's products are differentiated or it
 
has built up switching costs.
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6) The supplier group poses a credible threat of forward 
integration (pp. 27-8). 
The final force, located in the middle of Porter's model, is 
Rivalry Among Existing Firms. As firms attempt to gain competitive 
advantage over one another their actions usually produce countering 
reactions from other industry participants. These actions may be 
beneficial or detrimental to the industry as a whole. The effects 
of a price-war often threaten the existence of some industry 
participants, but Porter suggests that actions such as advertising 
battles may create greater differentiation and expand demand which 
should benefit the industry and the firms within it (p. 17). He 
further believes that industry rivalry will be more intense under 
the following conditions. 
1) Numerous or Equally Balanced competitors 
2) Slow Industry Growth 
3) High Fixed or Storage costs 
4) Lack of Differentiation or Switching Costs 
5) Capacity Augmented in Large Increments 
6) Diverse Competitors 
7) High Storage Stakes 
8) High Exit Barriers (pp. 17-21) 
The four external environment factors have been placed in the 
corners of Figure 1. This demonstrates that these factors may 
influence all five of the forces within Porter's internal or 
competitive environment. 
Porter addresses the issue of industry evolution in 
Competitive Strategy with the following. 
9
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Industry evolution takes on critical importance for 
formulation of strategy. It can increase or decrease the 
basic attractiveness of an industry as an investment 
opportunity, and it often requires the firm to make 
strategic adjustments. Understanding the process and 
being able to predict change are important because the 
cost of reacting strategically usually increases as the 
need for change becomes more obvious and the benefit from 
the best strategy is the highest for the first firm to 
select it. (p. 156) 
Industry evolution is considered by Porter to be the combined 
effect of those forces over time which can change the elements of 
the model presented in Figure 1. These are: 
1) Long-run changes in growth
 
2) Changes in buyer segments served
 
3) Buyer's learning
 
4) Reduction of uncertainty
 
5) Diffusion of proprietary knowledge
 
6) Accumulation of experience
 
7) Expansion (or contraction) in scale
 
8) Changes in input and currency costs
 
9) Product innovation
 
10) Marketing innovation
 
11) Process innovation
 
12) structural change in adjacent industries
 
13) Government policy change
 
14) Entries and exits (p. 164)
 
Porter believes that these changes vary in magnitude and direction 
with the industry, but examples can be observed in every industry. 
After examining these theories definite relationships between 
them can be observed. The firms within the industry are acted upon 
by a combination of the external and internal environmental forces 
throughout the evolution of the industry. This is the framework 
with which the adaptation of the five milling organizations 
addressed in this study will be analyzed. 
After the selection of a framework for analysis, research was 
conducted in three steps. First, a survey of literature in the 
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history of the industry was undertaken. Next, specific research 
was conducted to determine financial and economic characteristics 
for each organization. Finally, interviews were arranged with 
members of upper-level management of the selected organizations and 
with industry observers. 
There is not an abundance of published work specific to the 
flour milling industry. Two works however became primary sources 
of historical data in particular, Herman steen's Flour Milling in 
America and John Stork and Walter Darwin Teague's Flour for Man's 
Bread. 
Research specific to the organizations was conducted with 
general periodicals, trade journals, corporate evaluations, and 
corporate publications. Information was in most cases fairly easy 
to obtain, but there were some exceptions. The Pillsbury Company 
did not respond to any requests for information. The reason is 
unknown, but it is most likely related to its recent acquisition by 
Grand Metropolitan. Cargill also presented some problems in 
obtaining financial information, since it is a privately held 
company. This organization has traditionally been less public in 
its operations, and especially so in regards to financial 
performance. This lack of information in some ways limited the 
amount of analysis that could be conducted for this organization. 
There was also a limit to the amount of financial information which 
could be found for the earliest oldest periods for all the 
organizations. Especially helpful were complete corporate 
histories which were available for Cargill, ConAgra, and Pillsbury. 
11 
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The final portion of the research, interviews, was the most 
difficult. Inquiries were made to the headquarters of these 
organizations, and efforts were also made to work up to the top 
through middle and lower levels. A list of those members of 
management interviewed is presented below in Table 1. Results were 
mixed. A face-to-face interview was arranged with Charles M. 
Harper, the CEO of ConAgra, but persons of such position were not 
available for all the organizations. Despite this, at least one 
member of upper-level management was interviewed for their opinions 
on their organization, its evolution, and its business environment. 
Dr. Rick Whitacre, a professor of agricultural economics at 
Illinois state University was also interviewed to obtain 
information about the inputs of the milling industry, agricultural 
commodities. Further information was also obtained from Mr. Josh 
Sosland, co-editor of The Milling & Baking News, an extremely 
respected milling journal. Perspectives were also provided by the 
management of the Gilster - Mary Lee Corp., a manufacturer of 
private-label food products which also arose from a flour milling 
operation. 
12
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TABLE 1
 
l. ADM Carig Hamlin	 Pres. ADM Milling Co. 
2.	 Cargill James S. Hield Asst. V. Pres. of 
Public Affairs 
3. ConAgra Charles M. Harper	 CEO 
4.	 General Mills Robert Bratsman Contract Manufacturing 
Manager 
5.	 Pillsbury Darwin Borden V. Pres. of Flour 
Sales & Marketing 
(Retired) 
FINDINGS 
I. The Milling Revolution (1870-1899) 
Four of the five organizations selected in this study were 
established before the Milling Revolution of the late 19th century. 
Archer Daniels Midland was not established until the early 1900's. 
The Cargill Corp. traces its origin back to 1865 in Canover, 
Iowa when William Wallace Cargill opened a grain warehousing 
business. This consisted of purchasing grain from local farmers 
and arranging for its sale and transportation to another party for 
further processing. William Wallace Cargill diversified his young 
operation fairly early, and by the 1890's the company was involved 
in coal, lumber, insurance, and flour milling operations with over 
100 facilities in four states (Building on Tradition p. 3). 
Though not even formed until 1919, the four independent flour 
mills that would become the Nebraska Consolidated Mills Company, 
today known as ConAgra, were producing flour by the 1870's. These 
13 
were the Ravenna Mill, Hastings Mill, Henry Glade Milling Co., and 
the Blaidburn-Ferry Mill, all located in the agriculturally rich 
state of Nebraska. Henry Glade organized a system of grain storage 
elevators to supply his mills and was one of the first to put many 
of the new innovations produced by the milling revolution to use. 
Although he did not live to see the formation of N.C.M., many at 
ConAgra today, including CEO Mike Harper, attribute much of the 
early success of the organization to Glade's pioneering efforts 
(Limprecht p. 22). 
In 1866 Cadwallader Washburn erected a flour mill on the banks 
of the Mississippi river in Minneapolis, MN. Eleven years later a 
partnership was entered into with John Crosby, and the Washburn 
Crosby Co. was born (General Mills Historical Highlights p. 15A). 
The two men sold three brands of high quality flour, one of which 
won the gold medal at the Miller's International Exhibition of 
1880. "Gold Medal" flour soon became the top selling item of what 
today is known as the General Mills Corporation. 
The Pillsbury Co. was also formed in Minneapolis in June of 
1869 with the $12,000 investment of Charles and George Pillsbury. 
Like the Washburn Crosby Company, the Pillsburys had the foresight 
to locate their operation in Minneapolis, rather than what were 
considered to be more established milling centers in the East. 
Within a few years all the factors required for a successful 
milling business were available in Minneapolis, ample wheat, cheap 
power, and good transportation (Powell p. 21). 
The "Milling Revolution" was a span of twenty to thirty 
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years beginning about 1870 when numerous technological innovations 
occurred in the industry. Perhaps one of the most important was 
the Evans automatic mill system. This process reduced the total 
amount of labor needed by more than 1/2, eliminated all of the most 
strenuous labor, and increased the total flour yield from wheat. 
The perfection of the Middling's Purifier allowed spring wheat to 
be milled effectively Spring wheat grew well in harsh 
environments, but it was difficult to mill using methods available 
at the time. A process known as gradual reduction was also 
rediscovered during this time after a 100 year absence (Steen p. 
47) . It consisted of a slow grinding rather than complete 
pUlverization of the wheat kernel. This process was more time 
consuming, but allowed for production of finer quality flours from 
a greater variety of wheat. The development of the roller mill was 
also extremely important. The use of a series of rollers in the 
grinding of grain proved to be very effective in the gradual 
reduction process. This innovation brought about the end of the 
traditional millstone of the Middle Ages. Figure 2 shows u. S. 
flour production from 1860 to 1925 (Storck & Teague p. 210). The 
greatest percentage increases in production can be seen during the 
years of the Milling Revolution, the product of these and other 
technical innovations. American agriculture was also changing 
during this time. During the decade following the civil War more 
than half of all workers in the united States were employed on 
farms (Building on Tradition p. 7). Wheat production was 
approximately 200,000,000 bushels annually in the 1860's, 
17 
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FIG. 2 u.s. FLOUR PRODUCTION 
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340,000,000 in the 1870's, 480,000,000 in the 1880's, and 
588,000,000 by the 1890's (Steen p. 51). 
Total American population expanded and demographic patterns 
were shifting during this time. By 1880 the U.S. population was 
over 50,000,000, 63,000,000 by 1890, and 76,000,000 by 1900 (Steen 
p. 51). Throughout most of the 19th century U.S. communities were 
self-sufficient in many respects. The entire population was 
generally supported by food produced in the hinterlands. As urban 
populations grew new methods were required to fulfill the demand. 
This held especially true for flour. 
Those mills which had gained a reputation for consistent 
quality flour felt pressure to expand their operations in order to 
meet the needs of the country. As the industry became more 
mechanized, economies of scale arose. There was a small, but 
definite decrease in cost per unit as size increased. The 
modernization of the industry also demanded a great deal of 
capital. This required mills to become more proficient in the 
acquisition and management of capital as well. Perhaps one of the 
most important changes was the growth and development of the 
railroads. This new means of transportation allowed mills to 
locate away from the initial grain collection sites and ship their 
products to new and distant markets. 
The large modern facilities spawned during this time became 
known as the "merchant mills". In contrast to the grain-for-flour 
bartering that had occurred up to this time, grain purchases and 
flour sales were now conducted on a cash basis. Supplier and 
19 
Customer were no longer necessarily one in the same. Many small 
mills ceased operation, and hundreds of mergers and acquisitions 
occurred. By 1900 merchant mills produced 90% of all u.s. flour 
(steen p. 53). 
There is contradicting evidence as to the threat posed by new 
entrants at this time. Between 1850 and 1900 the number of milling 
operations grew from 11,891 to 25,338 (steen p. 51). However, the 
bulk of this expansion came in the western regions of the country 
in response to the population expansion there. Until this time the 
barriers to entry for new firms had been relatively few, but the 
use of new innovations required firms to invest large amounts of 
capital. The effect of the threat of new entrants was probably 
slight, if existent in influencing industry competitiveness. 
The bargaining power of flour buyers as a group had 
traditionally been minimal. Consumers were usually isolated from 
any other producer of flour other than their own local mill. with 
the Milling Revolution this changed. Commercial bakeries began to 
purchase increasingly larger amounts of flour. Expansion of the 
rail system and improved roads and canals allowed brands of flour 
to be brought to markets outside their immediate vicinity. 
Improvements in communication also allowed for better information 
exchange concerning wheat and flour prices in different regions. 
These factors combined to increase industry competitiveness. 
Substitutes were not a real threat to the industry. Flour at 
this time was considered a necessity. According to the Porter 
model this would tend to decrease the competitiveness of the 
20 
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industry. 
It is difficult to determine the power of suppliers as a 
group, the thousands of wheat farmers in America, during this 
period. The suppliers product, wheat, was essentially not a 
differentiated one. There was little threat of forward integration 
by suppliers in light of new barriers to entry. The milling 
industry was an important customer to the supplier, most likely the 
only one. The Porter model would suggest a decrease in industry 
competitiveness. However, during this time many farmers came 
together into "Grange" organizations. steen believes historically 
friction between millers and farmers has been so minimal it could 
be considered neglible (p. 133). still, Porter's model would 
expect industry competition to increase as farmers became more 
organized and gained greater price control. These different 
effects were most likely offsetting, making little change in total 
industry competition. 
Firm rivalry has traditionally been intense in the milling 
industry, and this time period was no exception. The industry 
participants not only had to contend with numerous competitors, but 
also the high storage costs inherent to the business. Mr. Josh 
Sosland, coeditor of The Milling Business News, stated that there 
were no pesticides available to stop insect infestations or 
preservatives to protect the quality of the product at this time. 
These factors had a strong influence in increasing industry 
competitiveness. 
Changes in the external environment were generally supportive 
21 
of the growth occurring in the milling industry. The economic 
expansion of the country provided the capital that was needed to 
invest in new operations. The benefits of new technologies in 
production and transportation are evident. 
Perhaps the greatest impact on the industry was caused by a 
political/legal change. In 1865 the chicago Board of Trade began 
the trading of grain futures. Futures contracts are similar to 
forward contracts in some respects. Unlike forward contracts 
though, quantity, quality, delivery date, and delivery point are 
all standardized. Price is the only variable (Atkin p. 2). 
The establishment of the futures market had three important 
effects. First, it provided a public source of prices, liquidity. 
Second, price stability was provided as the market greatly reduced 
seasonal fluctuations. Third, the reduction of volatility and 
uncertainty made operations in agricultural industries more stable 
(Atkin p. 18). 
Through successful futures market transactions milling 
companies were able to insulate themselves from some of the danger 
inherent in their industry. This process of risk management is 
known as hedging. Unfortunately many organizations discovered that 
miscalculations in the futures market could have disastrous 
results. Historically companies that have fared badly from futures 
transactions have been attempting to speculate, having no interest 
in the physical commodity, but attempting to make a profit. The 
use of futures contracts by milling operations at this time was 
actually minimal, but its importance increased in the years to 
22 
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come. 
Examining Porter's drivers of industry evolution we find 
several present in the milling industry during the late 1800's. 
with the rise of commercial bakeries and the urban population there 
was a distinct change in the buyer segments served and a structural 
change in an adjacent industry. Accumulation of experience and 
expansion of scale were also present. The most pronounced of these 
factors were the many process innovations that occurred during this 
time and the government policy changes at the Chicago Board of 
Trade. 
The effects of these environmental forces and evolutionary 
changes can be seen in the strategic decisions of the selected 
firms. During this time these companies were positioning 
themselves for future expansion in a time when increased 
competition would begin to force many firms out of business. 
The cargill Corp., though its milling interest was small in 
comparison to its total size, established a strong grain supply 
network and gained experience in grain trading on the futures 
market. Financial performance information during this time is very 
limited, as it is for most of these companies. Cargill's early 
diversification allowed for insulation against some of the risk 
inherent in commodity based industries. The experience gained in 
this process set the company at an advantage against firms who 
later would turn to quick diversification efforts without careful 
evaluation. 
Like Cargill, Nebraska Consolidated Mills also established a 
23 
strong network of suppliers and collection points. The company's 
use of new technologies, though not always successful, allowed 
N.C.M. to stay steps ahead of their competitors in terms of quality 
and speed. 
The Washburn Crosby Co.'s use of the Gold Medal brand proved 
to be very successful for the company itself and signaled a change 
in the way flour was marketed. As the railroads opened up new 
markets the Gold Medal brand provided consumers with an easily 
identifiable symbol, and whether or not it was warranted, it 
created differentiation in an industry which had witnessed little. 
The Pillsbury Co. also utilized the milling innovations of the 
time and the power of the Mississippi river to run their large 
operations. Despite a disastrous mill explosion, the Pillsbury's 
set high growth goals and met them. In 1889 Charles Pillsbury was 
quoted as saying, "The business of making flour had been brought to 
so close a point by competition that it is only possible to succeed 
by using the latest machinery and adopting the best system. It is 
purely a matter of business and must be conducted scientifically." 
(Powell p. 39). That is what the pillsburys did. 
II. Turn of the Century to the Great Depression (1900-1929) 
In 1900 the flour milling industry appeared established and 
stable, and the business environment was generally favorable. The 
milling processes were at this time all but perfected. American 
annual wheat production continued to rise. This combination of 
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factors contributed to a complacency within the industry. The 
organizations which still hoped to prosper were forced to adapt to 
the challenges presented by changes in the American diet and the 
nations entry into World War I. 
During this period the threat of new entrants was essentially 
neutralized. Most entrants were kept at bay by the high costs of 
capital investments required to successfully compete in the milling 
industry. Prime locations, those providing adequate power, raw 
materials, and transportation, were now occupied by established 
firms. These firms increased their flour output by a considerable 
percentage on an annual basis. In fact, the demise of thousands of 
small, rural mills came about as a result of one of the greatest 
innovations of the 20th century, the automobile. As the use of 
autos increased and roads improved the products of larger mills 
became available in more distant markets. Between 1900 and 1930 
the number of rural mills was cut by more than half, from 8,000 to 
less than 4,000 (steen p. 71). This total net decrease in industry 
participants would tend to decrease industry competition according 
to Porter's theory. 
The bargaining power of buyers increased during this time, 
which, according to the Porter model, would increase industry 
competition. Competition did increase during the late 1800's, 
primarily because consumers were presented with a greater 
selection. Through new advertising and merchandising consumers 
(households) and the commercial baking industry were made more 
aware of different flour producers. Flour quality was slowly 
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becoming more standardized, so few switching costs existed. The 
consolidation of commercial bakeries during this time also 
increased the buyer's bargaining power (Powell p. 113). 
At this time the threat of substitutes became a real issue. 
American per capita consumption of flour declined. steen reports 
that this figure dropped 20% over 20 years, from 224 lbs. per 
person in 1900 to 197 lbs. by 1920 (p. 67). 
The reasons for this decline are several. The American diet 
began to diversify at this time. More milk, meat, sugar, and 
vegetables were being consumed. Sosland reported that historically 
as a society becomes more affluent its per capita consumption of 
grains decreases. Commercial bakeries tended to use more non-flour 
ingredients in baking than household users. Americans also became 
less calorie focused and more concerned with vitamin intake (Storck 
and Teague p. 281). with more substitutes available, Porter would 
expect industry competition to increase. 
supplier bargaining power grew to some degree during the early 
part of this century. Though the large number of wheat farmers 
still guaranteed millers numerous raw material sources, farmers and 
grain merchants benefited from the arrival of a new food industry 
on the American business scene, prepared breakfast foods. Most 
millers were initially reluctant to enter this new industry, since 
they viewed the products as threats to their markets (Storck & 
Teague p. 274). For a short time before America's entry into 
w. W. I, when the crops of 1917 were disappointing, wheat prices 
soared in response to fears of shortages. This temporarily 
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improved the bargaining power of suppliers, and increased industry 
competition. This shift in power was soon negated when the Federal 
government set wheat prices at $2.26 per bushel (Steen p. 73). 
Over this period of 30 years the bargaining power of suppliers 
increased to a small degree, increasing overall industry 
competition. 
During this time the first fierce advertising battles were 
fought between milling firms. When flour was primarily a household 
item brand recognition was extremely valuable. Steen estimates 
that the number in use at one point may well have been near 10,000 
(p. 71). The importance of brands or "family flour" did decline 
slightly with the rise of commercial baking. Intense rivalry 
between firms and the four other forces in Porter's model combined 
to form an extremely competitive environment. 
The most important external environmental changes took place 
in the political/legal and social areas. Government policy changes 
were numerous. The Food & Drug Act of 1906 and the Interstate 
Commerce Act both proved to be beneficial to the milling industry 
through assurance of quality standards and revision of grain 
transportation regulations. America's entry into W. W. I also helped 
to eliminate some of the excess capacity that had arisen in the 
industry. Allied troops and the starving population of war-torn 
Europe needed flour, and American mills were able to supply it. 
The decrease in per capita consumption of wheat flour was also an 
important social change. This decline would continue from this 
so those companies that wished to increase size and profits 
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would either do so at the expense of other competitors or through 
expansion into new industries, like the emerging breakfast food 
industry. 
A case could be made that all of Porter's Drivers of Industry 
Evolution were present in some form during this time. Several are 
particularly apparent though. Long-run growth changes began to 
emerge as American diets were modified. Changes in input costs 
have also been mentioned. The increased use and focus on brands 
was an important marketing innovation. Government policy changes 
and firm exits also influenced the way in which milling firms made 
policy decisions. 
This period of American milling history began as a fairly 
stable one. Changes occurred however which made this traditionally 
competitive industry even more so. With market size beginning to 
decrease and alter in nature, firms were required to establish 
those policies which would allow them to expand or at least 
maintain their position in the new environment. 
Archer Daniels Midland can be traced back to this point with 
the formation of the Daniels Linseed Oil Co. in 1902. The 
operation was primarily involved in the production of linseed oil 
for use in vegetable oil and sale of the process by-products for 
use in various protein meals (Atkin p. 140). In 1923 the 
organization was incorporated as the Archer Daniels Midland Co., 
and a 1,500,000 bushel grain storage elevator was constructed next 
to their linseed oil production plant in Buffalo, NY. ADM was not 
involved in the milling of flour at this point. Through dealings 
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in soybeans and other commodities however, ADM gained experience in 
the purchase, transportation, processing, and marketing of 
agricultural products that would provide definite carryover to the 
milling industry. 
During the first quarter of this century the Cargill Corp. 
continued the expansion of its grain merchandising network. In 
1922 it lead the industry with the installation of a private 
internal wire system which was essential in the establishment of 
the company as a international organization (Building on Tradition 
p. 19). During World War I Cargill actually fared quite well. A 
profit of $399,000 was earned in 1918 through wheat trading and an 
additional $872,000 in barley (Broehl p. 227). The organization 
fell under criticism for earning such a profit at a time when most 
Americans were experiencing difficulties. Resentment towards grain 
millers and traders has always been present, and it continues to 
exist today. 
These years were extremely important to Cargill for two 
reasons. First, the availability of new technologies in 
transportation and communication coupled with managements' 
willingness to implement them allowed Cargill to become a force in 
the world market years before any of its competitors. Second, 
Cargill management began to diversify along what they described as 
"The Endless Belt" of commodities, integrating back to the supplier 
and forward to the consumer (Broehl p. 284). This concept, though 
probably not a new one, had never been applied on such a large 
scale or as effectively. 
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In 1918 a group of Nebraska flour millers proposed the merger 
of four independent mills in order to ensure their survival and 
profitability in a business environment which was becoming 
increasingly more hostile towards the small, rural mill. The 
following year the formation of the Nebraska Consolidated Mills 
Company was approved, and in 1920 the organization began to produce 
flour under its new name. A public stock sale was organized and 
advertised as "Absolute Protection to the Shareholder Against Any 
Calamity that May Arise." (Limprecht p. 25). organizers regarded 
the $840,000 of stock sold as disappointing. N.C.M. lost $115,000 
during its first 15 months, but by 1922 it was reporting $175,000 
in profits (Limprecht p. 30). with the purchase of the Updike Mill 
in Omaha that same year total capacity was doubled. Figure 3 shows 
Nebraska Consolidated Mills sales and profits from 1922-1929 
(Limprecht p. 296). 
Much like Cargill, these years contributed a great deal to the 
current success of ConAgra. Nebraska Consolidated Mills formed a 
network of strong mills within the state of Nebraska. This 
provided the organization the strength and finances it would need 
when it made the move into different geographic and eventually, 
product areas. 
In a speech delivered at a reception at the Harvard Business 
School H. B. Atwater, Jr., General Mills CEO, spoke about this 
period of his company's history saying, "our emphasis was on 
expanding our milling and related activities ... to become the 
world's largest flour mill" (Change and continuity. 3). In a rash 
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of acquisitions during a 5 month period in 1928 the relatively 
small Washburn Crosby Co. was transformed into a group of 27 
associated companies in 16 states (Fifty Years of Growth and 
Service p. 24). 
Important innovations occurred in both marketing and product 
development in the organization at this time. General Mills 
produced one of the best known marketing innovations in the history 
of food processing at this time, Betty Crocker. This fictional 
female was invented to help answer consumer questions about 
Washburn Crosby Co. family flour. Betty Crocker soon expanded her 
advice to all areas of baking and her audience through radio 
broadcasts of her "Cooking School of the Air" (The Story of Betty 
Crocker p. 2). In 1923 General Mills already had a small number 
of consumer products. The following year it introduced a flaked 
cereal derived from the whole wheat kernel, Wheaties. The company 
followed Wheaties' introduction with an extensive advertising 
campaign in both published mediums and radio. This emphasis on 
both printed and electronic advertising has stayed with General 
Mills through today. 
The beginning of the 20th century almost saw the demise of the 
Pillsbury Co. The company suffered from a number of problems 
during 1900-1907, including management problems and faulty 
bookkeeping (Powell p. 72). In 1907 a cash flow problem arose in 
part because of a u.S. cash crisis. In 1908 Pillsbury's position 
worsened, and the company was forced to go into receivership. 
Albert Loring became president of the newly organized Pillsbury 
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Flour Mills Co. in 1909. He not only brought the company out of its 
financial hole, but was also responsible for previously unknown 
prosperity. Loring made sure the quality of Pillsbury flour was 
reestablished. In 1913 production facilities were enlarged and the 
line of flours was broadened. The company also expanded packaging 
in 25, 50, and 100lb. amounts, not just the traditional 1961b. 
barrel(p. 102). By improving traditional products such as 
Pillsbury's Best Flour and expanding into breakfast foods with 
Health Bran and vitos Wheat Cereal, Pillsbury once again became a 
solid and profitable company. In 1923 the company acquired its 
first mill outside of Minneapolis in Atchison, Kansas. 
III. The Great Depression to World War II (1930-1947) 
Up until this time milling would have been considered by most 
to be a healthy industry. Although profits had not been large 
throughout the 1920's, most medium to large-sized firms possessed 
the funds which allowed them to modernize their facilities. 
Antiquated plants were usually forced to close, but this was part 
of the normal cycle of free market business. 
The Great Depression and World War II brought many changes to 
America and the milling industry. The legislative programs of the 
New Deal complicated the business environment for milling 
companies. The demands of a world at war also required the milling 
industry to adapt. 
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The threat of new entrants once again diminished during this 
time. Mergers and acquisitions were a common occurrence, as the 
number of industry participants dwindled. There had been 
approximately 4,000 rural mills at the end of W.W. I. This number 
had dropped to 1500 by the end of W.W. II (Steen p.88). As might 
be expected, little new construction occurred at this time. 
Barriers to entry were obviously quite substantial. Total industry 
capacity remained constant due to large numbers of mergers and 
acquisitions. Porter would expect industry competitiveness to 
decrease, since the threat of new entrants was essentially 
nonexistent. 
Between 1930 and 1947 American per capita consumption of flour 
continued to decline. The strength or organization of commercial 
bakeries did not change significantly during this time. These 
factors would tend to either leave the bargaining power of buyers 
unchanged or reduce it slightly, and thereby be expected to either 
slightly reduce or leave total industry competition unchanged. 
The threat of substitutes increased during this time. As 
Americans were experiencing financial problems they searched for 
the cheapest of consumer goods. This included flour. Many old 
brands lost their following as the search for other types of flour 
arose, such as buckwheat and rye (Steen p. 83). According to the 
model this would lead to an increase in overall industry 
competition. 
Wheat prices and supplies fluctuated during this period, and 
with them fluctuated the bargaining power of suppliers. Farmers 
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benefited during the New Deal, when wheat prices were held at 
artificially high levels. When these policies were relaxed and 
free market forces took over their strength declined. There was a 
major change during this time in the supply of an input which had 
remained fairly constant throughout the history of the industry, 
labor. The Wagner Act of 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938 forced milling organizations to recognize the right of workers 
to organize and eventually shorten workdays and workweeks. 
Overall, these changes combined to increase the bargaining power of 
suppliers and increased industry competition. 
The consolidation of the industry also continued. As firms~ 
decreased in number the remaining firms became closer in size. The 
industry, for reasons to be explained in the following paragraphs, 
also lost a large percentage of its export business. According to 
the Porter model, this would lead to greater industry competition, 
and this was the case in the industry during this period. 
As might be expected, the external environment was extremely 
turbulent during this time. Changes, particularly in the pol i tical 
sector, affect the industry still today. 
The enactment of a great deal of pro-labor legislation has 
already been mentioned, but there were other important legal 
changes. The revised Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 
among other things, gave the federal government the power to 
inspect flour mills. Industry leadership also worked to establish 
one of the first federal product definitions for flour. The New 
Deal put wheat prices at artificially high levels in order to 
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assist the American farmer. The milling industry was forced to 
reflect this increase in input costs in their flour prices. since 
u.s. prices were above world levels the milling industry lost 2/3 
of its export business. Firms were forced to concentrate more on 
the domestic market, dramatically increasing competition (steen p. 
83). A millers tax of 30 cents per bushel was also passed by 
Congress in 1933. Costs were passed on to the consumer, and in 
1936 the tax was declared unconstitutional. This combination of 
government intervention made market activities difficult. 
A major social change came in response to the reduced standard 
of living many Americans experienced as a result of the Great 
Depression. Since the diets of many were nutritionally 
insufficient, millers felt pressure to add vitamins and minerals to 
flour. The production of enriched flour came in response to this 
need. 
The economic problems of the 1930's also affected some of the 
milling industry's biggest customers. There were numerous 
insolvencies of commercial bakeries during this time, and 
collection on accounts from those still in operation was often 
difficult for the milling firm. 
There was little in the way of milling technological 
innovations. During the Depression years funds available for 
research where scarce, and in the years that followed most capital 
was put towards the war effort. 
Three of Porter's Drivers of Industry Evolution seem 
especially prevalent during this period. The enrichment of flour 
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was a major product innovation. The exit of the small firm 
continued, and even accelerated during these years. Of all of 
these though, changes in government policy were certainly the most 
pronounced. 
The milling industry was challenged by the years of the Great 
Depression and World War II. The loss of exports experienced 
during this time was probably the most devastating change. As 
firms were forced to turn back to their domestic market for sales, 
new product and marketing innovations were fueled and 
diversification into new areas became more attractive. Archer 
Daniels Midland entered the flour milling industry full-force in 
1933 with the acquisition of the Commander Larabee Co. Commander 
Larabee was a group of some 15 mills that could be traced to about 
1898. It had been SUffering from lackluster performance throughout 
the 1920's, but at the time it was ranked third in total production 
of flour (steen p. 315). Commander Larabee was operated as a 
separate division of ADM, and several years later its name was 
changed to the ADM Milling Co. The 1930' s were extremely important 
to ADM's soybean operation. ADM researchers discovered a way to 
extract lectin, an important food additive, from soybean oil. 
The 1930' sand 40' s were a period of both controversy and 
prosperity for cargill. In 1938 Cargill was accused by the Chicago 
Board of Trade of, if not illegal, at least ethically questionable 
actions in the trade of corn positions. Whether or not Cargill's 
actions were merely hedging or speculative was never really 
determined, but none the less Cargill was banned from the C.B.O.T. 
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Cargill also entered the formulated livestock feed market at this 
time with its "Blue Square" label, and began work with soybean 
meal. cargill began production of its own fleet of boats during 
the 1930' s to, as Cargill MacMillan said, "keep the boat owners 
honest" (Broehl p. 558). This proved to be a large source of 
revenue when the company was contracted by the u. S . Navy to 
construct ocean going freighters for the war. Though Cargill was 
restricted in many of its u.S. operations during this time, it was 
able to diversify and expand its operations internationally enough 
to remain profitable all but one year during this period (p. 558). 
Though still only a minor player in the milling of flour, the 
company was divided into grain warehousing, sales, country 
elevator, shipbuilding, seed, and administrative and financial 
divisions by the end of W. W. II. (p. 676). 
During this period Nebraska Consolidated Mills concentrated on 
its family (brand) flour sales and the development of its 
commercial bakery flours. The company was one of the first to 
utilize the new "daylight construction" style of mill architecture 
(Limprecht p. 38). This method utilized natural lighting and good 
ventilation through large windows and a sturdy, fire-proof frame. 
N.C.M. also anticipated new population trends in the Southeastern 
u.S. and located its first out of state mill in Decatur, Alabama in 
1941 (p. 44). Like Cargill, it diversified into formula feeds 
through its "Red Hat" label. Company sales and earnings are shown 
during this period in Figure 4 (p. 296). 
General Mills continued its expansion into consumer foods 
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during the 1930's and 40's and still maintained a strong presence• in the milling industry. Bisquick, a mUltipurpose baking mix, and 
• 
~ Cheerios breakfast cereal were among the most successful of the new 
•i
products introduced during this time. The "Breakfast of Champions" 
Wheaties slogan was also born during the 1930's. General Mills 
sponsored its first radio baseball broadcast in 1933 and its first 
television commercial six years later (Big G Cereals Advertising 
and Promotion Highlights p. A33). New sources of profits allowed 
General Mills shareholders to receive dividends throughout this 
period (General Mills Highlights A15). The company diversified 
into soybeans in 1941 and soon after established its chemical 
division. Everything from numerous food rations to torpedo 
directors was produced by General Mills for the war effort. By 
1945 the company was approximately 75% milling and 25% consumer 
food products (Change and Continuity p. 3). 
Though Pillsbury had recovered from its financial problems of 
the early 1900's, the company saw little growth during the 1930's 
and experienced several severe labor problems. Pillsbury net 
profits from 1890 to 1946 are shown in Figure 5 (Powell p. 72,126). 
The company was to a large degree, solely a milling operation, and 
the company's performance reflected the cycles of the wheat market. 
In 1940 Philip W. Pillsbury became president of what Powell 
described as "neither a promising or a progressive organization" 
(p.131). The company soon established a feeds division, and under 
the leadership of Philip Pillsbury a post-war planning committee 
was established shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
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Pillsbury had ignored new sources of growth for too long, and was 
now forced to catch up with its competitors. 
IV. Reconstruction (1947-1970) 
with the world no longer at war, the process of rebuilding was 
begun. Much of Europe's food processing capabilities were 
destroyed during the war years. American firms supplied most of 
the flour demands for Western Europe in the years which immediately 
followed. As Europe began to regain its own milling capacity 
closures and consolidations in the industry resumed. Once again 
those firms which hoped to survive felt pressure to expand into new 
areas for profits and growth. 
The threat of new entrants would appear to be minimal, if not 
completely nonexistent during this time. World markets declined as 
European reconstruction progressed. With this came a new round of 
mill closures. In a five year period from 1948-1953 the industry 
lost 132 plants of various sizes (steen p. 98). There were other 
reasons for the reduction in the number of mills during this time. 
Milling techniques were becoming more perfected, and with 
consolidations came an increase in the number of mills able to 
produce large volumes of flour. Economies of scale became a 
sizeable entry barrier during these years. On the basis of this 
information alone we would expect industry competitiveness to 
decrease. 
The bargaining power of buyers, particularly commercial 
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bakeries, increased. As the baking industry grew, its purchases 
became larger relative to sales of the milling industry. Flour as 
a product also became less differentiated. By 1960 commercial 
baking was purchasing 75% of all flour (steen p. 99). steen 
commented on this period saying, "During those years, milling was 
being transformed from the production and merchandising of consumer 
goods, at least in large part, into becoming the maker of raw 
materials for secondary processors." (p. 160). As products became 
less differentiated, switching costs disappeared and greater 
information became available to the buyer. Porter would expect 
these factors to contribute to a greater level of industry 
competition. 
The typical American continued to consume less flour during 
these years .. Per capita wheat flour consumption was 155 lbs. in 
1940, 135 in 1950, and 119 by 1960 (steen p. 94). The importance 
of meat in the American diet increased during this time. This 
explains the entry of many milling firms into meat and poultry 
operations. As the threat of substitutes increased, so did 
industry competition. 
It is difficult to determine the bargaining power of suppliers 
during this time. Wheat production fell slightly after rising to 
record levels in response to the war effort. The government was 
still enacting a fair amount of pro-farmer legislation. However, 
none of these changes were large enough to truly effect the power 
of the suppliers as a group during these years. This did little to 
either decrease or intensify industry competition. 
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Porter would expect the rivalry between existing firms to 
increase during the years that followed W. W. II for several 
reasons. Among the most important would be considered the slow 
level of industry growth and the increasing lack of differentiation 
and switching costs. 
There were numerous changes which occurred during this time in 
the external environment. Many patterns in the industry developed 
during these years that have only begun to change as we approach 
the 21st century. 
In the political/legal area the milling industry and the 
federal government continued their battle over wheat price 
controls. Though these regulatory pOlicies may have been useful 
during the Great Depression and war years, many were beginning to 
question their 'value. John Cargill, Jr. expressed his opinion on 
the debate by stating, "We will never have a sound economy until 
there is a wide realization that a managed economy will not work." 
(Broehl p. 777). By the 1950's the Administration appeared willing 
to utilize a more free market system of price determination. The 
Communist Revolution caused the loss of the Chinese flour trade, 
particularly hurting those American mills which had been organized 
on the west coast specifically to facilitate trade with the orient. 
This period also saw the establishment of the European Economic 
Community in 1957. This alliance was designed to promote the 
economy of Europe, and it would become important in terms of U.S. 
r
flour exports in the years to come. 
During this time there were few major changes in either social 
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or technological areas as far as the milling industry was 
concerned. Flour consumption continued its slow but steady 
decline. There were few major changes in processing technology. 
Technological changes effecting the industry were mainly in 
communication (first facsimile machine) and transportation 
(improved bulk railcars and trucking) . 
The economic recovery of the world had major implications for 
the milling firms which had thrived on the world's hunger in the 
years immediately after W. W. II. The loss of much of the flour 
export market and the sUbsequent closure of over one hundred firms 
mentioned earlier demonstrates the effects of this occurrence. As 
the American economy began the boom of the 1950's and 60's milling 
profits were growing, but not at the rate of the rest of the 
economy. Traditional milling profits fluctuated slightly, but they 
neither exploded with the booms nor plummeted with economic 
downturns (steen p. 101). 
Many of Porter's Drivers of Industry Evolution were present 
during this time. The rise of the commercial baking industry was 
a major change in the type of buyer segments served. As the world 
became more politically and economically stable there was an 
obvious reduction in the uncertainty of the business environment. 
Government policy changes came in the form of a reduction of price 
controls. 
From 1947-1970 the milling industry settled into a slow growth 
pattern in which it appeared likely to remain for years to come. 
Major diversifications took place during this time within the 
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participating in a wide range of areas such as grain storage, grain 
merchandising, formula feed manufacturing, flour mixes, 
refrigerated dough, soybean processing, and agricultural chemicals. 
A quick look at this list reveals that the companies selected in 
this study were competing in some of these areas years before this 
period. 
Though it experienced some difficulties during this time, 
Archer Daniels Midland expanded not only its milling operations, 
but also its chemical and soybean operations. The newly formed ADM 
Milling Co. was a strong presence in the industry and sold almost 
entirely to commercial baking operations (steen p. 263). The 
chemical division seemed a promising area during these years, but 
it was actually' incurring losses by the end of the 1960's. As this 
period ended ADM management recognized the importance of soybeans 
as an edible source of protein in the years to come. Large capital 
investments were made in this area as the 1970's began. 
As the 1950's began Cargill saw little opportunity in its 
domestic markets and decided to concentrate its efforts 
internationally. Successful attempts were made to increase its 
share of the world market in grains, edible beans, and other 
commodities. The company also began the commodity trade of salt. 
While cargill's efforts in the American market were small, they 
were important. In response to American's increased meat 
consumption, cargill entered the broiler chicken industry in 1965. 
It expanded both its poultry and international operations with a 
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joint venture with the Korean government in 1968. The company also 
originated the idea of the "rent a train" that year. By renting an 
entire 115 car unit the company saved a tremendous amount on 
transportation costs. Through this operation midwestern grain and 
oilseeds were hauled from Gibson City, IL to Baton Rouge, LA for 
export to international markets. 
Nebraska Consolidated Mills also diversified during this 
period into new areas, but expanded its milling operations offshore 
as well. The 1950's saw an increase in the number of women in the 
work force. In response many food products that claimed to be 
labor-saving were introduced. As Limprecht says, "Nationwide a 
number of companies marketing packaged cake mixes to give 
housewives the satisfaction of home baking with less of the time­
consuming fuss. The trouble was, the cakes didn't taste like 
much." (p. 51). N.C.M. researchers perfected a quality mix, 
obtained the endorsement of a well known food critic at the time, 
and introduced Duncan Hines cake mix in 1951. The product was a 
tremendous success. The company set an initial yearly sales quota 
at 100,000 cases and sold six times that in the first six months 
(Limprecht p. 57). The cost of marketing a highly visible consumer 
food product began to catch up with the company, however. In 1955 
Duncan Hines mix constituted 2/3 of N.C.M.'s total sales, but it 
also had an advertising bUdget close to the entire company's net 
worth (p. 66). Shipping costs were also high, and the rest of the 
industry was beginning to catch up. The brand was sUbsequently 
sold to Procter & Gamble in 1956 for an after tax profit of 
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approximately one million dollars. 
The company also expanded its more traditional operations 
II 
II during this time. In 1959 flour milling operations were opened in 
Puerto Rico. Though they initially lost money, by 1966 they were 
producing 1/2 of Nebraska Consolidated Mills' profits (Limprecht p. 
79). Poultry operations were opened and quickly expanded, and the 
sale of formula feeds in Spain was initiated. By 1967, the 
company's 50th birthday, average earnings on common equity were 
around 21%. Between 1959 and 1969 earnings per share compound 
growth rate was 20%. The three largest sources of company profits 
at the end of this period were 40% flour, 24% feed, and 21% poultry 
(p. 96). Figure 6 shows Nebraska Consolidated Mills profits and 
earnings during this period (p. 296-7). 
General Mills initially pursued a similar course. In the late 
1940' s the company introduced a variety of Betty Crocker food 
products, including pie crusts and desserts. Like other industry 
leaders it also began to search for new growth outside the u.S. and 
found it in Canada, Venezuela, Guatemala, Mexico, and Nicaragua. 
The 1960's brought tremendous changes to the General Mills 
organization. 50 Years of Growth and Service, a corporate history, 
states "we were unlikely to grow and prosper in some of our most 
I
•
•
•
•
I
I 
I
I
I 
I 
cherished and historic product lines." (p. 26). Questioning the 
company's reliance on commodities and feeling pressure to expand 
growth into new, more profitable areas, it closed its animal feed, 
electronics (mechanical), and 1/2 of its flour milling divisions 
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during this decade (General Mills Historical Highlights 15A). 
Diversification was then pursued in five major areas, consumer 
foods, toys, fashion, specialty retailing, and restaurants. 
Consumer foods made up approximately 45% of sales and 76% of 
I 
I 
I 
I 
earnings during this period (Change and Continuity p. 4). 
I The Pillsbury Co. entered this period with a three-fold plan 
for diversification and growth, 1) compete successfully in consumer 
II 
I foods, 2) develop major new markets in the u.s. and Europe, and 3) 
undertake nonfood acquisitions (Powell p. 153). The company 
introduced several new food products such as refrigerated dough and
 
I potato dinners in the 1950' s. There was also a renewed emphasis on
 
II 
Pillsbury's flour. Pillsbury attempted to become the efficient,
I low cost producer in the industry and increase its bakery sales (p. 
177). The company expanded its milling operations in Europe, 
Australia, and the less developed countries of South America. In 
II 1965 the Pillsbury regained its position as the largest American 
flour miller. In keeping with the company's restaurant goals, ~ Burger King was purchased in 1967 for over 19 million dollars. In 
1969 the company celebrated its 100th birthday with $569 million in 
sales and $14.4 million in profits. Financial performance during
-
this period is shown in Figure 7 (p. 154,192). Sales could be 
broken down into 43% consumer food, 35% agricultural products, 14% 
international, and 8% Burger King (p. 185). In contrast to General 
Mills, diversification at Pillsbury did not come at the expense of 
more traditional lines of business. 
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v. Approaching Century's End (1970-1991) 
This final period was a time of both failure and renewal for 
many of the milling industry participants. As unrelated 
diversifications began to fail companies were forced to reexamine 
business strategies. The 1970's and 80's also saw a changes in 
American health concerns which proved to benefit the industry in 
unexpected ways. 
Continuing in the established trend, the threat of new 
entrants was practically nonexistent. Acquisitions of those 
smaller milling operations which had remained independent up until 
this time were made by the industry giants. According to Josh 
Sosland, in 1991 the four largest producers of flour, in order, 
were ConAgra, Cargill, ADM, and General Mills. The top 3 companies 
account for between 60 and 75% of total production. Under normal 
conditions, economic theory would expect this arrangement to lead 
to an oligopoly. other factors have combined however to keep this 
industry at a level of intense competition. 
The bargaining power of buyers increased over this period of 
twenty years. The purchase of flour by households continued to 
decline as the percentage of flour going to the commercial baking 
industry increased. Flour could be considered effectively 
undifferentiated, a true commodity. switching costs were few in 
terms of loss of quality or time in selecting a new supplier. The 
amount of information available to buyers had never been greater. 
According to the Porter model this would bring about a definite 
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increase in industry competition. 
The change in the threat of substitutes during this time is 
extremely important, in fact Josh Sosland considers it to be the 
most important change in the industry since the Milling Revolution. 
Figure 8 shows American per capita consumption of flour from 1972 
to 1991 as reported by Sosland. As the graph shows, in the 1970's 
average consumption of flour began to increase once again after 
nearly a hundred years of decline. This occurrence went against a 
pattern that had existed for literally centuries in many different 
societies and obviously had major implications for the industry. 
American millers could actually expect market growth. As flour 
consumption increased it would appear that the threat of 
sUbstitutes was decreasing, and thereby decreasing industry 
competition .. 
The bargaining power of suppliers drastically changed during 
the early 1970' s. Between 1972-73 the Soviet Union secretly 
entered the American commodities market and bought up large amounts 
of soybeans, wheat, and other grains. This action sent a wave of 
panic through the market (Limprecht p. 7). Figure 9 shows Chicago 
Board of Trade wheat futures prices from 1966 through 1991. In the 
years before the Soviet purchases wheat prices typically fluctuated 
between 30 and 40 cents per bushel, per year. The graph shows the 
panic that ensued in the years that followed. Prices on average 
now fluctuate between $1.50 and $6.00. 
Before this time risks in input acquisition were slight. 
After 1973 firms were forced to become proficient in the futures 
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markets in order to limit their risk exposure. Dr. Rick Whitacre 
feels this has been the greatest challenge to milling industry 
participants in the last half of the century. 
As the market for wheat and wheat flour expanded the 
bargaining power of buyers decreased slightly. This change would 
be expected to decrease industry competition in Porter's model. 
Rivalry among existing firms intensified during the 1970's and 
80's. Factors in the Porter model which contributed to this were 
high exit barriers, equally balanced competitors, and lack of 
differentiation and storage costs. 
Changes in the external environment both threatened and 
nurtured the milling industry during this period. Successful firms 
adapted to hostile changes and capitalized on beneficial ones. The 
federal government was in and out of the agricultural sector 
throughout most of this time. Examples of policies directly 
effecting wheat and flour prices are numerous. One of the more 
recent was the Export Enhancement Program of 1985, a SUbsidy 
program that was designed to make u.S. agricultural commodities 
more attractive to European Economic Community members. Sosland 
stated that this program was deficient because it did not include 
value added products such as flour. 
The most important social change at this time for the milling 
industry was definitely the increase in per capita consumption of 
flour. Health conscious Americans became more concerned with fat 
intake during this time and less wary of starches. Michael D. 
Walter, president of ConAgra's specialty grains division stated he 
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sees a "new era of consumer interest in grains and fiber" (Milling 
and Baking News Jan. 30, 1990 p. 17). He also believes that this 
is not just a temporary change in the American diet saying, "The 
benefits of grains and fiber are there, and people are going to 
continue to eat healthy in the future." (p. 17). As demand for 
flour increased, an industry that appeared to be firmly in the 
maturity stage of the product cycle began to grow once again. 
There were also changes in the economic sector which 
influenced the milling industry. The numerous recessions the 
economy experienced may have actually helped the industry, since 
during downturns in the economy consumers usually purchase less 
meats and more grain. Overvaluation of the u.s. dollar is clearly 
detrimental to American exports. This holds true for flour as 
well. It is' the overvalued dollar that is at least partially 
responsible for the decline of flour exports during this period. 
According to Sosland exports today account for less than 10% of 
total flour production. 
The technological area of the external environment did not 
undergo drastic changes, rather a more gradual refinement of 
existing processes. Faster, more reI iable, and safer machines were 
designed. Working conditions at the average flour mill have 
improved dramatically since the turn of the century. 
This final period saw the transformation of some milling 
industry leaders into giants. Some of these giants secured their 
positions in the industry, most likely for many years to come. It 
was also during this time that one former giant began to move out 
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of the industry. 
In the July 1990 issue of Money magazine Richard Elam of 
Blunt, Ellis, & Loewi spoke of Archer Daniels Midland saying, "This 
is a company of small details. It does a huge number of things, 
and it does almost all of them extremely well." (p. 60). The 
company diversified heavily and grew in already established areas 
throughout the 1970's and 80's. Management saw the demand for 
processed soybeans expanding and bought up several operations at 
discounted prices. According to the company's Form 10K filed with 
the securities and Exchange Commission ADM now employs 13,049 
people and operates 136 processing plants in oilseed, corn, 
milling, and elevator operations. ADM financial performance 
debt structure is shown in Table 2. 
and 
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TABLE 2
 
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND
 
Financial Performance Data
 
Sales 
'91 
8468 
(Source: 
'90 '89 
7751 7929 
ADM 1991 Annual Report) 
'88 '87 '86 '85 
6798 5775 5336 4739 
'84 
4907 
'83 
4292 
'82 
3713 
425 
Net Earnings per share 
Earnings 467 484 
(in millions) 
353 265 239 
$1.47 
1991 
118 
1.55 
1990 
164 110 
1. 38 
1989 
155 
Weighted # of shares outstanding 312,819,000 311,724,000 
Capital Structure as of 9/30/91 
(Source 1992 Value Line) 
Total Debt: 1,242 million Debt = 19% of Capital 
Due in 5 Years: 215 million Common Stock = 81% of Capital 
Long Term Debt: 987 million 
Long Term Interest: 80.5 million 
ADM has been involved with the Soviet union since the early 
days of the Cold War with soybean and wheat operations. with the 
fall of the communist party will likely come new and gr~ater 
opportunities for growth. 
Though Archer Daniels Midland might be better known today for 
soybean processing or amino acid production its presence and 
success in the flour milling industry should not be overlooked. 
Craig Hamlin, president of the ADM Milling Co., feels that flour 
milling is an important part of ADM operations. He said, "Our 
wheat flour milling allows us to compete in a very important area". 
Though milling does not offer as high as returns as some of the 
industries ADM is involved with, it is a stable one which is now 
providing moderate growth. ADM's presence in the industry is also 
growing. At the time of this writing ADM Milling Co. is acquiring 
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approximately 1/2 of the flour mills of the Pillsbury Co. 
Once again the Cargill Corp. grew. Operations were expanded 
into cotton, beef, coal, steel, and metal processing during the 
1970's and 80's. Even as early as 1972 Cargill was trading 1/4 of 
the entire united states wheat crop (Building on Tradition p. 35). 
While cargill's growth was impressive, it did not live up to 
the expectations of management. In the 1960's the company had 
hoped to double the company every 5 to 7 years. Cargill was not 
achieving these results. At the end of this period earnings were 
approximately less than 1% of sales (Youngblood p. 10). Profit 
margins have traditionally been small for commodity based 
companies, but the performance of cargill was not acceptable. In 
order to return to past levels of performance the company began to 
diversify into three areas, 1) joint ventures into new foreign 
markets, 2) greater presence in consumer foods, and 3) dramatically 
increasing flour milling operations to take advantage of increasing 
per capita consumption. 
cargill initiated a series of mill acquisitions in the 1970's 
which today has placed it as the #2 producer of flour in the 
country. A Cargill pUblication, Sometimes Numbers Tell the Story 
reports Cargill produces enough flour to produce 8.6 million lIb. 
loaves of bread each year (p. 3). Among cargill's most recent 
expansions and acquisitions was the construction of a new mill in 
stockton, CA, one of the nations fastest growing markets (Milling 
and Baking News Dec. 18, 1989 p. 8), and the acquisition of four 
pillsbury mills in 1991 (Milling and Baking News Jan. 29, 1991 p. 
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1). Within a period of 20 years Cargill built a very solid milling 
division. 
Much more changed at Nebraska Consolidated Mills than the 
company name during these 20 years. This time period saw the 
established milling firm at the very edge of bankruptcy and then 
grow to 20 billion in sales by the end of the 80's. 
The company was renamed "ConAgra" in 1971, meaning "in 
partnership with the land" (Limprecht p. 98). Two years later, in 
1973 the company reported a record profit of 6 million dollars. 
The next year the company incurred a 12 million dollar loss 
(Limprecht p. 3). The company was caught in a soybeans futures 
position when in 1973, in response to the panic caused by the 
Soviet's entry into the market, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
arbitrarily canceled 1/2 of all soybean contracts in order to keep 
the U.S. supply. The Chicago Board of Trade then prohibited entry 
into old futures contracts. This locked the company into its old 
contracts, incurring a loss of 17 to 18 million dollars in soybeans 
alone for fiscal year 1974 (p. 3). 
In 1974 Charles M. Harper became president of the ConAgra. 
His plan for revitalizing the company called for a general "belt 
tightening" and focusing on simple goals. Harper explained the 
company was placed in a unique position because ConAgra was in such 
bad financial shape. "It was sort of a question of what do you 
want to be when you grow up." he said. Harper stated that the 
company's goal was to become the "best earning food company in the 
United States". Decisions had to be made whether or not to remain 
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in traditional commodities with their dangers or move into new 
areas. In regards to this question Harper said, "We decided to 
stick with grain. Grain is a common thread through most food. 
with the exception of vegetables and potatoes, grain prices and 
supplies influence meat, breads, TV dinners, and ice cream." 
With this plan in mind ConAgra began to rebuild its 
organization through both traditional grain operations and careful 
diversification into consumer foods. In 1981 the company acquired 
banquet frozen foods, and corporate sales reached 1 billion 
dollars. This figure reached 5 billion by 1986, when Morton, Chun 
King, and Armor Foods were acquired. ConAgra continued to grow in 
consumer foods, agricultural products, grain merchandising, and 
flour milling throughout the 1980's. The company's Healthy Choice 
line of food products, designed to provide low fat meals that still 
tasted good, became the nUmber 1 selling premium frozen food dinner 
in less than 2 years (Liesse p. 53). The company reached 19.5 
billion in sales in 1991. More ConAgra financial performance data 
and debt structure is presented in Table 3. Company sales and 
earnings from 1970 - 1989 are shown in Figure 10 (Limprecht p. 
297) . 
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TABLE 3 
CONAGRA 
Sales 
'91 
19504 
Financial Performance Data 
(Source: ConAgra 1991 Annual Report) 
'90 '89 '88 '87 '86 '85 '84 
15501 11340 9475 9001 5911 5498 3301 2308 
, 83 
1709 
'82 
Earnings 311 
(in millions) 
232 198 155 149 105 6392 3348 
Net Earnings 
$2.13 1.87 
Per Co
1.63 
mmon Share 
1.29 1.23 1.02 .89 .69 .61 .56 
Weighted Average of Common Shares outstanding (in millions) 
136.9 123.2 120.6 118.8 119.3 101.8 101.3 91.8 79.7 58.2 
capital Structure as of 11/24/91 
(Source: 1992 Value Line) 
Total Debt: 4,303 million Debt= 47% of Capital 
Due in 5 Years: ? Preferred Stock= 8% of Capital 
Long Term Debt: 2,112 million Common Stock= 45% of capital 
Long Term Interest: 232 million 
Though consumer foods currently make up 77.1% of ConAgra's 
sales and 76.2% according to the company's 1991 annual report, 
flour milling is still extremely important to the company (p. 14). 
Mike Harper gave testament to this, saying, "Flour milling is the 
bedrock of ConAgra." 
The 1970's found General Mills an extremely diversified 
organization. In consumer foods it was marketing Yoplait yogurt, 
Gorton's frozen seafood, and Chef Saluto pizza. Kenner and Parker 
Bros. constituted the company's toy division. The clothing 
division held brands such as Izod, Monet, and Eddie Bauer. General 
Mills competed in restaurants with Red Lobster and York Steakhouse. 
The 1960's goal of diversification in order to escape some of the 
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risks of commodity based industries was achieved, but was not a 
success. General Mills soon found that marketing a Parker Bros. 
game or an Izod sweater was decidedly different from marketing Gold 
Medal Flour. The lack of experience in these new industries and 
the advertising drains of many highly visible brands soon became 
too great. The company divested many of its less promising and not 
surprisingly, unrelated operations during the 1980 I sand 
concentrated on those which it believed held the greatest growth 
possibilities, consumer foods and restaurants - (General Mills 
Historical Highlights p. 15A). 
Management developed a three part competitive strategy, 1) 
balanced diversification, 2) competitive industry positioning, and 
3) aggressive consumer marketing (Change and Continuity p. 11). 
Bob Bratsman,-General Mills Contract Manufacturing Manager, added, 
"General Mills has attempted to pursue benchmarking, becoming the 
low cost, quality producer in whatever industry they compete~" 
General Mills has successfully expanded both of its two basic 
segments in the past years. The acquisition of The Olive Garden 
chain of Italian restaurants has proven very successful. 
Restaurant sales reached 2.21 billion dollars in fiscal year 1991, 
up 15% from the year before. (General Mills 1991 Annual Report p. 
14) Innovations have also occurred in consumer foods such as 
microwaveable breads. 
In terms of flour milling, General Mills (#4 in terms of 
production) has attempted to gain more of the commercial baking 
industry market. The September 5, 1989 issue of The Milling and 
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Baking News reported, "Milling industry growth is concentrated in 
the baking flour segment" (p. 27). The company has also attempted 
to create differentiation by offering an oat blend flour to the 
commercial baking industry. 
General Mills has been held in high regard by corporate 
analysts for many years. Duff & Phelps reported in their July 15, 
1991 evaluation of the company, "We regard General Mills' food 
division as among the industry's finest, based on its above average 
record in new product development and unit volume growth" (p. 1). 
Table 4 shows current General Mills financial data and debt 
structure. 
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-TABLE 4
 
GENERAL MILLS
 
Financial Performance Data
 
(Source: General Mills 1991 Annual Report)
 
'91 '90 '89 '88 '87 '86 '85 '84 '83 '82 
Sales 7513 6448 5620 5178 5189 4856 4285 5600 5550 5312 
Earnings 472 
(in millions) 
381 414 283 222 183 (72) 233 245 225 
Net Earnings per common 
$ 2.87 2.32 2.53 
share 
16.3 1.25 1.03 (.41) 1.24 1.22 1.11 
Weighted Average of Shares Outstanding (in millions) 
164 164 163 174 177 178 179 188 200 202 
capital Structure as of 11/24/91 
(Source: 1992 Value Line) 
Total Debt: 1,110 million Debt= 39% of Capital 
Due in 5 Years: 445 million Common stock= 61% of Capital 
Long Term Debt: 821 million 
Long Term Interest: 67 million 
pillsbury began this period with a wave of acquisitions 
designed to improve the company's lagging performance. The Steak 
and Ale restaurant chain, Fox Deluxe Foods, and the Green Giant 
Corp. were under Pillsbury ownership by 1978. Profits hit 2.16 
billion dollars a year later (Powell p. 215). Pillsbury sales and 
profits are shown in Figure 11 (p. 231). 
By the mid 1980's however there were signs that Pillsbury was 
in trouble. Pillsbury stock was consistently behind the industry 
average. Numerous marketing errors were also being made. For 
example, Totinos frozen pizza had a 33% share of the market at one 
point in 1987. Pillsbury decided to raise prices, and one year 
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later Totinos market share had slipped to 18.2% (Business Week Mar. 
14, 1988 p. 37). Pillsbury's hopes for Burger King also never 
materialized. The May, 1989 issue of Canadian Business summed up 
Pillsbury's position saying, "In recent years however, Pillsbury 
became better known for sloppy marketing, sluggish cost cutting, 
and constant management turnover." (p. 55). 
According to Darwin Borden, former Vice President of Flour 
Sales and Marketing at Pillsbury, those in the very top levels of 
management took a dim view of all of the company's agricultural 
operations. Pillsbury budget allocations for maintenance and 
modernization of particularly milling operations reflect this lack 
of commitment on part of the company. Along with the rest of the 
company, pillsbury's milling operations performed poorly. 
In the years that followed Pillsbury eventually became a 
target for takeover. Several attempts were made, but the offer 
made by Grand Metropolitan, PLC of Great Britain of $60 per share 
(5.7 billion dollars) was finally approved in January of 1989. 
Grand Met believed that Pillsbury would strengthen the holding 
company1s position in its three competitive sectors, beverages, 
food, and restaurants. Grand Met believes the key to 
revitalization of Pillsbury is brand building and brand 
advertising. In that light the company increased ad spending 60% 
across all businesses (Liesse Jan. 8, 1990 p. 7). 
In regards to flour milling, Borden stated, "Grand Met decided 
that if Pillsbury wasn1t going to be committed to the milling 
industry they would get out. I don I t blame them." Numerous 
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closures and layoffs were initiated. The largest and most recent 
is the sale of about 1/2 of all mills to Archer Daniels Midland. 
The company that was either the number 1 or 2 miller of flour for 
over 75 years is today not even in the top 10. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There are few industries whose product is of such importance 
and seems, to the consumer, to have remained so unchanged for 
literally hundreds of years. This image of consistency is on the 
surface alone, however. These organizations have adapted to 
numerous and often hostile changes in their external and internal 
business environment. The industry leaders have also been forced 
to reposition themselves in order to weather trends which appeared 
dangerous and unstoppable, such as the decline in per capita 
consumption of flour and the massive consolidation within the 
industry. 
Though their performance has varied from year to year, the 
level of success these organizations have achieved naturally 
suggests the formulation of effective business polices and 
strategies. The success of these companies can, to a large degree, 
be attributed to their effectiveness in 3 important areas. 
1. Willingness to Utilize New Technologies 
In any processing industry the discovery and adoption of any 
new technology that will allow you to produce your product better, 
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faster, or cheaper than your competition is a primary goal. In the 
milling industry especially, where profit margins have historically 
been low, any change that may save a few cents per cwt. is a major 
advantage. 
The importance of the Milling Revolution and the innovations 
it offered industry participants should be obvious by this point. 
These firms (if they were involved in the production of flour at 
this time) were among the first organizations to implement the 
Evans automatic mill system, the improved middlings purifier, and 
the roller milling. Those firms which failed to utilize these new 
milling innovations not only lost customers to more technologically 
advanced firms, but they soon became targets for either sale or 
closure in the wave of consolidation which swept the industry. 
Not all technological innovations important to the success of 
these firms came directly into the milling process. Cargill was 
one of the first organizations to utilize an important innovation 
in communication, the private telegraph. This technology allowed 
Cargill the information flow it needed to conduct commodity trade 
on a global level. other innovations occurred in transportation. 
ConAgra, Cargill, and ADM improved their performance by utilizing 
improved rail, barge, ship, and truck transportation. 
The recent sale of the Pillsbury mills to Archer Daniels 
Midland could be regarded as sign that industry consolidation has 
not yet ended. If this continues those firms such as ADM, ConAgra, 
and Cargill which appear to be well established in the industry 
will be forced to adopt new technologies in all areas to keep their 
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market shares from dwindling. 
2. Successfully Adapting to Rapid and Numerous Changes in Federal 
Government Policy and the International Economy 
The federal government has affected the milling industry since 
shortly after the signing of the Constitution. These actions have 
come in numerous forms, such as the artificial inflation of wheat 
prices during the New Deal and the Export Enhancement Program of 
1985 mentioned earlier. In many instances these programs and 
others appear to have made the industry unnecessarily complicated. 
Management interviewed was asked what changes they would like to 
see on the federal level. Answers varied. Mike Harper of ConAgra 
responded jokingly with, "that they'd go away." craig Hamlin of 
ADM commented, "We must be realistic and realize that the federal 
government is going to be present in some capacity. I would like 
to see approval of products {additives and pesticides} for use in 
the milling industry sped up. The lag in approval of needed 
changes is a major problem." Darwin Borden of Pillsbury believes 
that the main problem with federal government programs is a lack of 
consistency. "The government needs to decide whether or not it is 
going to be involved in the production and sale of flour." says 
Borden. 
Borden believes the changing presence and magnitude of 
government intervention has resulted in a cycle which is very 
damaging to the industry. He explains that typically the 
government devises a new program, typically in the form of 
subsidies of some kind. Firms adjust their strategies to take the 
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program into account. Usually within a matter of a few years or 
even months the program expires, or funding runs out, and the 
program is dropped. Firms change their strategies once again 
usually just in time for the implementation of a new federal 
program. 
The international economy has also challenged the industry. 
While traditionally foreign markets have provided opportunities for 
American millers, today these same opportunities can disappear 
quickly with fluctuations in currency rates or protectionist 
policies. The entry of the soviet Union into the grain market was 
also an extremely important change. Dr. Whitacre of I. S. U believes 
it to be the most important since the Milling Revolution. The 
introduction of new and sizeable risk required major adjustments, 
including the development of the very difficult skill of commodity 
futures trading. 
3. Careful Diversification Into Related Industries 
In response to the uncertainty these firms face in a commodity 
based industry many sought to diversify into other areas. The 
successful companies appear to be those which were able to achieve 
a balance between expansion into new and different areas and 
maintaining a strong presence in their original business. 
Both sides of the "diversify or stay" debate have benefits and 
dangers. Staying with the established business offers a familiar 
and perhaps safer environment. There are dangers to this course of 
action though. In the milling industry those companies which did 
not seek new sources of growth and profits through diversification 
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often found themselves facing closure or acquisition by larger, 
more diversified firms. Successful diversification is definitely 
a source of growth and profits, but these companies have learned 
that these undertakings must be made with a great deal of care. In 
new lines of business organizations often have little or no 
experience in the face of new challenges. This can often lead to 
less than desirable results. 
The most successful diversifications have been achieved by 
firms which have 1) developed a primary line of business in order 
to obtain financial strength and accumulation of experience, 2) 
diversified into related businesses, and 3) maintained a strong 
presence in the primary industry. There are many examples of this 
in the milling industry. ConAgra built a solid flour milling 
operation, diversified into grain storage and trading, next to 
meats and poultry, and today with nearly 20 billion dollars in 
sales, produces not only commercial baking flour, but also animal 
feeds, fertilizers, Armor meats, Banquet frozen foods, and a wide 
variety of Healthy Choice brand consumer food products. Though 
their paths of diversification have been somewhat different, 
Cargill and ADM have evolved into companies similar to ConAgra, 
competing in many of the same areas. 
Within these organizations there are also examples of 
unsuccessful diversification. Bob Bratsman of General Mills 
suggested his company overextended itself when it entered household 
appliances in the 1930's and clothing and toys in the 1960's. Both 
of these diversifications proved costly to the organization. 
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Although there is no specific data to point to, it is •

suggested that part of the problems the Pillsbury Co. has 
experienced in recent years could be due to its neglect of its •

primary industry, milling. Though agriculture operations typically 
do not offer huge profit margins, they do offer stability in the •

organizations industry mix. As pillsbury lost flour customers it •

not only lost revenue, but also its presence in an important 
sector of the industry. •

The success of the American milling industry can to a large 
degree be attributed to the success of what are today Archer •

Daniels Midland, Cargill, ConAgra, General Mills, and Pillsbury. •
Total U.S. flour production from 1926 through today is shown in 
Figure 12. The policy decisions made by these firms allowed them •

no only to survive, but grow in size and profits during a wide 
variety of environmental changes such as periods of great •

instability in their input markets, dramatic expansion and then •
contraction of international markets, and a powerful wave of 
consolidation which still appears to be effecting the industry •

today. Through diversification and continued focus on their 
primary agricultural industries these companies have become some of 
the most stable in American history. 
What challenges the next 150 years will present to the milling 
industry no one can say. Quite simply though, regardless of any 
change in political idealogies or space travel, man will still need 
to eat. It is unlikely the importance of grains in the human diet 
will decline, and neither will the importance of this industry. 
•

•
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